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Abstract— Shipping event is found as an influential 
and positive force which donates to huge global 
trading activities. The sea transportation actions 
contribute to sea problem, especially on oil spill. 
There are several factors donating to an oil spill 
problem at sea. However, this research emphasis on 
two factors which are on human factors and technical 
factors. The scope of research focuses at Penang Port 
and Government related bodies.  A semi structured 
interview was conducted among respondents from 
law enforcement and government related bodies 
which comprises of Agency Penguat Kuasaan Marin 
Malaysia, Environment Department, Penang Port 
Authorities and Marine Department. Upon approval, 
only five main respondents were interviewed from 26 
total samples and population who are among middle 
level of management from different related 
government agencies. The human factor elements 
caused an oil spill comprises of inadequate 
knowledge, fatigue, lack of training and 
misunderstanding throughout ship operation. 
Meanwhile, the technical factor elements comprise of 
bad weather at sea, old on board equipment, ship do 
not enter the dock and system failure. The result 
shows the oil spill is significantly caused by human 
factors, especially by the lack of training at 18%, 
fatigue among crew for 18%, inadequate knowledge 
among crew at 18%, crew misunderstanding of ship 
operation at 16%, old equipment at 9%, system 
failure at 9%, bad weather at 9% and finally only 3% 
due to ship which do not enter the dock. 
Keywords— Oil Spill, Shipping Activities 
1. Background Research 
Generally almost every year 1 800 million tons of 
raw petroleum are transported via ocean in the 
world (Hänninen and Rytkönen, 2004). Marine 
transport is one of the most secure transport ways 
and mostly an oil is transported securely to its 
destination. In any case, there is dependably a 
danger of a tremendous oil slick. Previously, there 
have been huge oil tanker accidents conveying 
about giant volumes of oil slicks that have 
prompted significant open consideration and to an 
endeavor to discover approaches to minimize the 
dangers identified with such occasions. Regularly, 
substantial oil slick mishaps are connected with the 
crash, establishing or weight loss of support 
trustworthiness. A portion of the accidents has 
brought about vast monetary misfortune and 
neighborhood harms to the earth. These mischances 
have an impact on the improvement in the sea 
models and well-being enactment. Typically 
corrections of enactment are taken after significant 
disasters and preventive activities are still 
phenomenal. This research extents discussion on a 
special reference to oil spill made by shipping 
activities especially in Penang Port. The Penang 
Port is situated along the Malacca Straits and it is 
more influenced to the oil spill problem since the 
straits is an international route. Daily, there are 
various types of vessel use this port. It is assumed 
the impact of this issue could create a repercussion 
for the economy of the country. There are several 
significant factors which leading of this oil spills 
problem. Thus, this research is conducted to 
examine contribution factors of this issue, which is 
from human factor and technical factor. This 
research focuses on government related bodies such 
as Marine Department, Agensi Penguat Kuasaan 
Maritim Malaysia (APMM) and Police Marine. 
2. Scope and Location of Research 
This research focuses on Penang Port which has 
shipping activities that could lead higher intention 
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to occur an oil spill problem at sea. The 
information is gathered from appropriate 
government agencies such as the Penang Marine 
Department, Penang Port Authority, Penang 
Environment Department and Agensi Penguat 
Kuasaan Maritim Malaysia (APMM). Penang is 
recognized as a gateway port for Peninsular 
Malaysia’s in Northern Region. This is a reputable 
port serving one of the region’s busiest trade 
routes. It is proficient in handling 25 million tons of 
cargo annually, it adores connecting with to 200 
ports worldwide. It serves the Malaysia-Indonesia-
Thailand growth triangle and has a thriving 
manufacturing-based hinterland. Penang Port is a 
well linked with land and air modes and is 
manageable to and from all the major economic 
regions in Peninsular Malaysia. 
 
 




Figure 2: Penang Port (Google Map, 2016) 
 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
3.2 Oil spills 
An oil slick is the appearance of a fluid petroleum 
hydrocarbon into the earth, particularly marine 
regions, because of human movement, and is a type 
of contamination. The term is normally connected 
to marine oil slicks, where oil is discharged into the 
sea or beach front waters, yet spills may likewise 
occur ashore. Oil slicks force because of influxes of 
raw petroleum from tankers, seaward stages, 
penetrating apparatuses, and additionally spills of 
refined petroleum items, (for example: gas, diesel) 
and their by-items, heavier fills utilized by huge 
ships (for example: fortification fuel, or the spill of 
any sleek decline or waste oil). The oil slick might 
be transported by an operational and an incidental 
arrivals of transportation exercises (Vanem, 2009). 
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation 
Limited (ITOPF) has collected information about 
oil slicks 1974. Most oil slick occurrences have 
been a repercussion of a mix of various activities 
and environments. Operational causes are surrogate 
stacking/releasing, bunkering and different 
operations. Incidental causes give frequently to 
ascend to bigger oil slicks. Involuntary causes are 
delegated crashes, groundings, structure 
disappointments and flame and blasts. (ITOPF, 
2012.) Only 25 % of the oil entering the ocean 
through transportation is brought about by 
coincidental oil slicks. 
3.2 Factor cause an oil spill 
 
3.2.1 Human factor 
It is stated that, 80% of oil slicks and marine 
accidents have been endorsed to human elements, 
either singular mistakes or hierarchical 
disappointments (Hee, 1999, Rothblum, 2006, 
Hetherington, 2006). As technologies increase, for 
example: double hull structures can decrease the 
significance of an oil spill created by groundings or 
crashes, yet it can't obstruct with the chain of 
occasions that may bring about the mischance to 
happen in any case. Then human factors or human 
mistakes have brought on frequent accidents. For 
example: Exxon Valdez (1989), accidents were 
halfway brought about by human error has 
concentrated on human mistake and marine safety. 
Some type of human mistake has brought about, at 
any rate incompletely, around 75–96 % of marine 
setbacks and 84–88 % of tanker mishaps. Thus, it 
leads to the oceanic loss rate has remained high 
Chauvin, (2013). The International Safety 
Management Code (ISM code) has been built up to 
diminish the event of human mistakes. Presently, 
the ISM code has been obligatory over 10 years on 
safety society in the sea business (Lappalainen, 
2008). Gordon (1998), proposed a structure of 
describing the connections between basic human 
factors and rapidly clear human errors, as appeared 




in Figure 3. Gordon sorts human factor as 
individual, group, or organization, and takes after 
the Rasmussen model (Rasumussen, "Recognitions 
on the Concept of Human Error," 1993 in Gordon, 
1998) of ordering human mistakes as aptitudes 




Figure 3: Human factors VS Human errors 
(Gordon, 1998) 
 
3.2.2 Types of human factor and technical 
factor 
Gordon (1998), proposes three classes of human 
elements that add to accidents in the seaward oil 
industry, including tanker operations: organization 
factors, group factor and also individual human 
factors. It is found that in spite of the fact that the 
larger part of prompt causes is rigid from people, 
the dominant part of contributing, or basic, 
components can be credited to the hierarchical sett 
or gathering progression that impacts the person. 
Correspondingly, once an accident series has 
started, authoritative impacts may permit the 
grouping to keep, bringing about a mischance. 
Thusly, the way of life, motivating forces, working 
methodology, and methods of associations affect 
the security of marine framework (Hee, 1999). 
3.2.2.1 Organization factor 
A few study and case audits have found that 
organizational factors might be the most basic in 
considering human factor contributing to an oil 
spills. At the organization level, different 
foundations or factors may add to an expansion in 
occurrences and accidents, including cost-cutting 
projects and the level of correspondence between 
work-sites (Gordon, 1998). 
 
3.2.2.2 Group factor  
At the group level, the influences over people, the 
individuals from a vessel group, for example, or 
between a boss and subordinate, may influence 
safety. Group factors may cover with organization 
factors, however, in the marine oil transportation 
industry, the flow at the group level, for example, 
groups or duty sections, can be acute to general 
security (Gordon, 1998). A main significant group 
factor of tanker processes is the environment that 
exists on operational units, for example: a vessel 
team or crew. The sea convention of "iron men on 
wooden boats" has been referred to as a benefactor 
to hazard taking conduct. Overconfident or bluster 
may add to the activities that disregard an 
organization's expressed security tactic. Weight 
from the association or organization to meet 
unrealistic requests for the number and 
competences of accessible work force may 
empower variable or hazard taking conduct as team 
stretch to meet requests for bosses. 
3.2.2.3 Individual human factor 
Although most researchers identify the significance 
of the organizational safely culture, the part of the 
individual administrator is basic. The capability, 
perceptual judgments, anxiety, inspiration, and 
health dangers, (for example: work over-load) of an 
individual administrator are basic to the chain of 
occasions that may bring about an accident or oil 
slick (Gordon, 1998). Two of the most perceived 
and examined unusual components as identified 
with the marine industry are portrayed here: 
inadequate knowledge and fatigue. 
3.2.2.4 Inadequate knowledge  
A National Research Council (NRC) studies (1990; 
cited in Rothblum, 2006), cited inadequate 
common technical knowledge as the cause of 35% 
of marine casualties: “Mariners often do not 
comprehend how the operation works or under 
what set of operating conditions it was deliberate to 
work effectively.”. In the same study, 78% of 
mariners ascribed a lack of understanding of the 
complete system of the ships while working on as a 
contributing factor of accidents. Moving among 
different sizes and types of vessels can cause 
misperception and conciliation decision-making 
abilities if mariners are not familiar with the ship-
specific systems. At the point when individuals 
take activities that build the danger of 




disappointment, it is regularly in light of the fact 
that they have experienced a rare occasion that is 
not a portion of their preparation or general 
mindfulness, and they are unconscious of how their 
activities will influence the framework or are 
ignorant that they are adding to mischance hazard 
(Pate-Cornell and Murphy, 1996). The mariner is 
accused of settling on route choices taking into 
account all accessible information. Too often, it is 
tended to depend on either a favored bit of gear or 
our memory. Several casualties result from the 
failure of counsel accessible information, (for 
example, that of a radar or a noise sounder). In 
dissimilar cases, serious information or data might 
need or wrong, prompting route mistakes (such as, 
bridge supports frequently are not stamped, or 
floats might be off-station) (Rothblum, 2006). 
3.2.2.5 Fatigue  
US Office of Marine Safety, Security and 
Environmental Protection and the Office of 
Navigation Safety and Waterway Services found 
that fatigue was among the top three causes of 
marine accidents (Gordon, 1998). Rothblum, 
(2006) cites studies by the Marine Transportation 
Research Board in 1976 and the NRC in1990 
where fatigue was the primary concern of mariners 
in both cases. In an Australian report that analyzes 
reporting methodologies and the relationship 
between sleep, fatigue, and accidents in Incident at 
Sea Reports, Phillips (2000) found that 86% of the 
reports analyzed made some reference to sleep, 
although many of these references described the 
sleep loss as a way of life on board ship rather than 
as a direct causal factor. Thirty-nine per cent of the 
reports considered sleeping or sleepiness as a 
contributing causal factor. Research has illustrated 
that there are potentially disastrous outcomes of 
fatigue in terms of poor health and also diminished 
performance (Josten, Ng-A-Tham, & Thierry, 
2003). 
3.2.2.6 Other individual factor  
Pate-Cornell and Murphy (1996), oppose that 
people are basically rational, but their goals and 
risk attitude may not always match those of the 
organization, due to policies that may inadvertently 
encourage adverse behavior. People typically act to 
obtain awards and avoid negative penalties, but 
more weight is generally given to potential 
negative consequences to themselves, such as being 
trapped and punished, rather than how specific 
behaviors may contribute to catastrophic accident 
risks. Production pressures, an organizational 
factor, may contribute to risk-taking behaviors, 
because the potential for reward for high 
production may outweigh the consequences of the 
worst-case scenario, especially for activities where 
that risk seems particularly remote.  Another 
component of individual human factors can be 
attributed to a lack of readiness for crises. 
Operators may be extremely proficient in routine 
day-to-day operations; however, because crises 
occur so rarely and are not always well foreseen, an 
operator may be poorly prepared to deal with such 
an event. Finally, people have a tendency to 
disregard information that is inconsistent with their 
views until it becomes certain. This has been cited 
as a cause for impractical optimism in a variety of 
industries where accident risks are categorized by 
insecurity. Only when faced with inevitable, 
catastrophic concerns do people acknowledge the 
potential for disaster, at which point intervention 
may not be possible. 
Figure 4: Relationship between sleep loss, 
fatigue, and accidents (Phillips, 2000) 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1 The semis structured interview 
 
An interview is a conversation with two or more 
person between an interviewers and respondents. 
The interview is commonly to acquire information 
about someone and produce inclusive, flexible data 
with questions asked. The interview meeting is a 
subjective exploration method which normally 
covers directing concentrated individual meetings 
with respondents. It is also used to investigate 




points of view on a specific thought, project, or 
circumstance. The semi-organized interview is a 
subjective interview that is characterized by a pre-
set question direct.  It aims to provide in-depth 
results from informal deliberation with members 
(Collis and Hussey, 2013). This interview strategy 
was picked over unstructured or organized 
meetings, since this review expects to answer the 
exploration inquiries by asking particular inquiries, 
however less (unstructured) that it creates wasted 
information, and not all that less (organized) so as 
not to pass up a major prospect of any unexpected 
data. The semi-organized meeting guide to give 
unique procedure of guidelines on questioners and 
provides dependable, alike subjective information. 
The semi-organized meetings are used in this 
research since it is frequently ended before by 
perception, unexpected and unstructured talking 
keeping in mind the end goal to permit the 
specialists to build up a sharp comprehension of the 
theme of interest vital for creating relevant and 
important semi-organized inquiries (Cohen, 2006). 
The interview session was conducted among law 
enforcement and government associated bodies in 
Penang water on oil spill experiences. The 
respondent bodies are from: 
i) Penang Environment Department 
ii) Penang Port Authorities 
iii) Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim (APMM) 
iv) Penang Marine Department 
 
Table 1: Semi structured interview 
 
 
4.2 Population, sample and respondents 
Umar (2016), state that the validity of data onto 
respondents in qualitative method should be 30% 
and above for sample. Each respondent signifies 
sample and the population of the research. The unit 
analysis of this research involves an individual 
among Top Management and Middle Management 
who has sufficient knowledge on oil spill and, is 
representing the different four marine government 
organizations. The actual population of this 
research is 37 staff and, the targeted sample is 
among 26 samples covers among Middle 
Management which upon discussion have agreed to 
participated in responding to the research 
questions. However, due to time constraint and 
other full agenda during the interview session only 
five or 19.23% authorized respondents who have 
contributed in this research which comprises 
among middle level of management in various 
associated marine law enforcement in Penang. The 
qualitative analysis is based from the five 
respondents respectively. 
 
Figure 5: Population, sample, respondent. 






Environment Department (2) 
Penang Port Authorities (4) 
Marine Department  (3) 
 
Middle Management: 26 
APMM (5) 
Environment Department (6) 
Penang Port Authorities (10) 
Marine Department (5) 
Sample 
26 
Middle Management: 26 
APMM (5) 
Environment Department (6) 
Penang Port Authorities (10) 
Marine Department (5) 
Respondent 
5 
Middle Management:  
APMM                              : 1  
Environment Department  : 2  
Penang Port Authorities    : 1  
Marine Department           : 1  
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Figure 7: Graph of population, sample, respondent, 
from each department. 
 
5. Data Analysis 
5.1 Human and technical factors results 
 
It shows the breakdown elements caused by 
human factors which contribute to spill are by 
lack of training for 18%, fatigue among crew at 
18%, inadequate knowledge among crew at 
18%, crew misunderstanding of ship operation 
at 16%. Meanwhile the results caused by 
technical factors of oil spill are by old equipment 
at 9%, system failure at 9%, bad weather at 9% 
and finally only 3% due to ship which do not 
enter the dock. The respondents are from 
related law agencies, bodies who have working 
experiences ranging from 9 to 18 years. All of 
the respondents have agreed the oil spill is 
caused mostly by human factor rather than 
technical factors. 
 






Figure 8: Result for human and technical factors 





It is concluded that, based from the different 
respondents from the four different government 
authorities at Middle Management Level which 
stated that the human factors caused significantly 
compared to technical factors towards an oil spill 
by shipping activities in Penang Port water area. 
The human factors caused a higher percentage of 
oil spill, especially by lack of training, fatigue, 
crew misunderstanding during ship operation at sea 
and inadequate knowledge. Meanwhile, the 
technical factors also contributed to an oil spill 
problem, but in a small percentage. However, this 
oil spill issues to keep on permanently arising, but 
it can be reduced.  (Rothblum, 2006), shows 78% 
of mariners eligible a lack of understanding of the 
complete system of the ships while working as the 
causal factor to spill. Hee (1999), stated 80% of oil 
spills and marine accidents have been recognized 
due to human factors, individual errors and 
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